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FACING REALITY: THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT 
FALLS SHORT FOR WOMEN UNDERGOING INFERTILITY 
TREATMENT 
Katie Cushing∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Having a child is a major life event around which most Ameri-
cans build their lives.  For millions of couples in the United States, 
finding out that they are unable to conceive is a crushing emotional 
blow.
1
  Increasingly, infertile couples are placing their hopes of hav-
ing a child in infertility treatments, most commonly through in-vitro 
fertilization (IVF).
2
  Women who choose to undergo IVF, however, 
face two risks in the employment setting.  The first is that insurers or 
employers will deny insurance coverage for the treatment and, thus, 
make IVF impossible to afford.  Second, and worse, is the risk that the 
potential mother’s employer will terminate her for taking time off to 
undergo infertility treatment.  Do women have legal recourse to 
combat refusal of insurance or adverse employment actions?  The an-
swer to this question remains unclear despite a significant amount of 
litigation and scholarship in this area.
3
  Even so, it seems that women 
have some protection against adverse employment actions, but they 
still have no legal means of requiring employers to provide insurance 
coverage for infertility treatments.
4
 
In 1978, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964
5
 to include the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).
6
  The PDA 
 
 ∗ J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., magna cum laude, 2007, 
The College of New Jersey.  The author would like to thank her family and friends 
for their love, support, and patience.  Additionally, the author thanks her comment 
editor, Bradford Muller, and Professor Charles Sullivan for their guidance and advice 
throughout the writing and editing process. 
 1 See STAFF OF RESOLVE WITH DIANE ARONSON, RESOLVING INFERTILITY 40–41 (Diane 
N. Clapp & Margaret R. Hollister eds., 1999) [hereinafter ARONSON]. 
 2 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., As-
sisted Reproductive Technology, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last visited Mar. 14, 
2010). 
 3 See infra Parts V–VI. 
 4 See infra Part VII. 
 5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006). 
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defined sex discrimination as including discrimination on the basis of 
“pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”
7
  Thus, Con-
gress made clear that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy consti-
tuted discrimination on the basis of sex.
8
  Since the enactment of the 
PDA, however, the lower federal courts as well as the courts of ap-
peals have struggled to define its scope.  One of the most significant 
and controversial issues confronting the judiciary today is the confu-
sion surrounding infertility treatments, particularly IVF, and whether 
women undergoing IVF have any protection under the PDA.  Recent-
ly, in Hall v. Nalco Co.,
9
 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
held that adverse employment actions based on a woman’s need to 
take time off to undergo IVF constituted discrimination on the basis 
of the gender-specific condition of childbearing capacity.
10
  In effect, 
the court recognized that an infertile female employee terminated 
for receiving IVF could maintain an action against her employer pur-
suant to the PDA.
11
  Unfortunately, even after Hall, the PDA falls 
short in a significant way—it does not require that employers provide 
insurance coverage for infertility treatments.
12
 
This Comment surveys the law surrounding infertility treatments 
and gender discrimination and concludes that the legal protection 
for female employees undergoing IVF is disappointing and inade-
quate.  Part II of this Comment discusses the causes and prevalence 
of infertility as well as the various treatments available for infertile 
couples, specifically IVF.  Part III then examines the history of the 
PDA, including the Supreme Court case
13
 that prompted Congress to 
enact the PDA.  Next, Part IV looks at two of the Supreme Court cases 
that followed the enactment of the PDA,
14
 which provide some guid-
ance to the lower courts in interpreting the PDA.  Part V summarizes 
three cases from the courts of appeals and their respective approach-
es in interpreting the PDA in the context of infertility treatments.  
 
 6 See § 2000e(k). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Congress “change[d] the definition of sex discrimination in title VII to reflect 
the ‘commonsense’ view and to insure that working women are protected against all 
forms of employment discrimination based on sex.”  S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 3 (1977). 
 9 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 10 Id. at 645. 
 11 Id. at 649. 
 12 See discussion infra Part VI. 
 13 See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gil-
bert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1964 Amendments 
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). 
 14 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).   
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Part VI analyzes the three cases and explores the strengths and limita-
tions of each court’s approach.  Finally, Part VII asserts that Congress 
should amend the PDA to clarify the scope of “related medical condi-
tions” to provide more protection to women undergoing IVF against 
adverse employment actions like terminations and demotions.  Fur-
thermore, Part VII concludes that existing federal statutes, such as 
the PDA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
15
 and the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),
16
 are the inappropriate legal tools to 
compel employers to provide coverage for infertility treatment be-
cause they were not designed for this type of claim.  Additionally, 
state laws are limited in scope and lack the benefit of uniformity.  In-
stead, this Comment suggests that the most promising avenue for ob-
taining insurance coverage for infertility treatments is through lobby-
ing Congress to pass legislation like the proposed Family Building Act 
of 2009, which is designed to address the financial needs of infertile 
couples seeking fertility treatment. 
II. INFERTILITY: A PHYSICAL DISEASE AND AN EMOTIONAL 
ROLLERCOASTER 
Infertility is a serious and widespread condition affecting ap-
proximately 7.3 million couples of reproductive age in the United 
States.
17
  It is a disease of the reproductive system that interferes with 
one of the human body’s most basic functions—the ability to repro-
duce.
18
  Infertility is a term used to describe one’s inability to become 
pregnant after one year of sexual intercourse without conception.
19
  
 
 15 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). 
 16 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006). 
 17 In 1992, Congress enacted the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to 7 (2006), which requires that each assisted reproductive 
technology (ART) clinic in the United States report its annual pregnancy success 
rates to the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  
ARONSON, supra note 1, at 189.  The CDC uses data compiled and published by the 
Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), an affiliate organization of 
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).  Id.  In the United States 
in 2002, about 7.3 million of approximately 61.6 million women, fifteen to forty-four 
years of age, received some kind of infertility services at some time in their lives.  See 
Anjani Chandra et al., Fertility, Family Planning, and Reproductive Health of U.S. Women: 
Data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, in DATA FROM THE NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH, at 29 (Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., Vital and Health Statistics Series No. 23, 2005), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ 
series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf. 
 18 Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Quick Facts About Infertility, 
http://www.asrm.org/detail.aspx?id=2322 (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).  
 19 ARONSON, supra note 1, at 5.  
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Occurring equally in both men and women, infertility does not dis-
criminate on the basis of sex.
20
  About one third of infertility cases can 
be attributed to male factors, one third to female factors, and the re-
maining one third is because of either a combination of male and 
female factors or is unexplained.
21
 
In addition to its physical aspects, infertility provokes strong 
emotions, such as grief, anger, and guilt.
22
  Most couples dream of 
having a family and assume that they can have children one day.
23
  
When that possibility is jeopardized by an infertility diagnosis, it can 
be an extremely painful and difficult reality to face.
24
  In fact, an in-
fertility diagnosis engenders such intense emotional feelings that 
mental health professionals consider it a life crisis.
25
  “Coping with in-
fertility requires the same kind of psychological and physical strength 
as does coping with the death of a parent, a divorce, or a life-
threatening disease.”
26
  While infertility is a frightening and emotion-
al diagnosis for many couples, an increasing number of treatment op-
tions are available.
27
  Still, understanding the severe emotional effects 
of infertility is essential to improving the legal protection for women 
pursuing such treatment options; legal change cannot come about 
until infertility treatment is accepted as a necessity rather than a lux-
ury. 
Today, infertility is no longer a taboo issue, mainly because of 
the advances in medical technology that have led to a number of 
treatment options and have given hope to millions of infertile 
couples.
28
  Some treatment options include fertility drugs and hor-
monal treatments, surgery, and assisted reproductive technologies 
(ARTs).
29
  The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) defines ARTs as “‘all treatments or procedures that involve 
the handling of human eggs and sperm for the purpose of helping a 
woman become pregnant.’”
30
  The number of ART cycles performed 
 
 20 Id. at 7. 
 21 Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, What is Infertility?, http://www.americanpregnancy.org 
/infertility/whatisinfertility.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). 
 22  ARONSON, supra note 1, at 40–41. 
 23 Id. at 40. 
 24 See id.  
 25 Id.  
 26 Id. 
 27 See infra text accompanying note 29. 
 28 ARONSON, supra note 1, at 6. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 175 (quoting Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs.).  ART includes “in vitro fertilization (IVF), gamete intrafallopian 
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each year doubled from 1996 to 2005 because of, in part, the correla-
tion between age and fertility.
31
  As men and women age, they expe-
rience a significant decline in fertility.
32
  With more women waiting 
until their thirties and forties to have children,
33
 an increasing num-
ber of women are turning to ARTs to achieve pregnancy.
34
 
This Comment is primarily concerned with IVF, the most com-
monly used ART.
35
  IVF is a procedure in which fertilization occurs 
outside of the woman’s body in a laboratory dish.
36
  IVF is used to 
treat infertility problems, such as tubal factor, endometriosis, male 
factor, and unexplained infertility.
37
  Even when a male-factor causes 
infertility, the woman must undergo IVF because the procedure re-
quires that the embryos be placed in the uterus.
38
  While IVF offers 
many couples the possibility of building a family, the process and cost 
of treatment is often an arduous and stressful journey that may inter-
 
transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), embryo cryopreservation, egg 
or embryo donation, and gestational carriers. . . . ART does not include intrauterine 
insemination (IUI).”  Id.  ARTs, like IVF, involve four basic steps: ovulation stimula-
tion and egg maturation, egg retrieval, fertilization, and embryo placement in the 
uterus.  CAROL TURKINGTON & MICHAEL M. ALPER, UNDERSTANDING FERTILITY AND 
INFERTILITY: THE SOURCEBOOK FOR REPRODUCTIVE PROBLEMS, TREATMENTS, AND ISSUES 
40–41 (2003). 
 31 “The number of ART cycles performed in the United States has more than 
doubled, from 64,681 cycles in 1996 to 134,260 in 2005.”  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2005 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 61 (2007), available at   http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ 
ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf [hereinafter CDC SUCCESS RATES]. 
 32 See ARONSON, supra note 1, at 11; see also TURKINGTON & ALPER, supra note 30, at 
10–11 (“[B]ecause eggs are some of the longest-living cells in the body, there is a 
greater risk that the eggs may be defective with each subsequent year of life.”). 
 33 The birth rate for women aged forty to forty four increased nearly twofold 
from 48,607 births in 1990 to 95,788 births in 2002.  Joyce A. Martin et al., U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., Births: Final Data for 2002, 2003 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., 
Dec. 17, 2003, at 6, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ 
nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_10.pdf; see David E. Williams, More Hurdles as Women Delay Birth, 
CNN.COM, Apr. 24, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/04/21/later.childbirth/ 
(explaining that more women over the age of thirty five gave birth to more than 
586,000 babies in the United States in 2004, which comprised approximately 14% of 
births that year and marked an increase from 5% fifteen years earlier). 
 34 The average age of women receiving ART services was thirty six in 2005.  CDC 
SUCCESS RATES, supra note 31, at 15. 
 35 “IVF currently accounts for about 98% of ART procedures.”  Am. Pregnancy 
Ass’n, What is Infertility?, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/infertility 
/whatisinfertility.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 36 ARONSON, supra note 1, at 176.  In-vitro is Latin for “in glass.”  Id. 
 37 Id. at 177. 
 38 See id. at 155, 176. 
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fere with one’s work and social obligations.
39
  Each IVF cycle may re-
quire weeks to complete, and if a pregnancy does not result, many 
IVF cycles may be required.
40
 
With the average cost of an IVF cycle in the United States being 
$12,400, IVF is an expensive procedure.
41
  In addition to the emo-
tional and physical obstacles that infertility causes, many women will 
face financial obstacles relating to two different employer actions: 
their employer may refuse to provide insurance coverage or a health 
plan that includes infertility treatments, and their employer may ter-
minate them for taking time off from work to undergo infertility 
treatment.  Thus, financial obstacles may force women who cannot 
afford infertility treatment without insurance coverage or who have to 
forgo infertility treatment to avoid losing their job to abandon their 
dream of having a family.  Whether infertile women have legal re-
course to overcome these obstacles is still unclear.
42
 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S 1978 DECISION IN GILBERT LED TO THE 
ENACTMENT OF THE PDA 
Congress enacted the PDA in 1978 in response to the United 
States Supreme Court decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
43
 in 
which the Court held that discrimination based on pregnancy did not 
constitute discrimination based on sex.
44
  In a class-action suit 
 
 39 See RESOLVE: The Nat’l Infertility Ass’n, Making Treatment Affordable, 
http://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_mta_home (last visited Apr. 
1, 2010). 
Infertility exacts an enormous toll on both the affected individuals and 
on society.  Women and men in their most active and productive years 
are distracted by the physical, financial and emotional hardships of this 
disease.  Infertility is more than a disease, it is a devastating life crisis 
which can greatly impact the health, relationships, job performance 
and social interactions.  Added to the emotional and physical toll ex-
acted by infertility is the financial burden carried by many seeking 
treatment. 
Id. 
 40 See MAYO CLINIC FAMILY HEALTH BOOK 1069–70 (Scott C. Litin et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2003).  An IVF cycle normally begins with requiring the woman to take ovulation-
stimulating drugs.  TURKINGTON & ALPER, supra note 26, at 41.  The eggs are then 
surgically removed and mixed with the sperm in a Petri dish.  Id. at 42.  If the eggs 
have been fertilized by the sperm, then the fertilized eggs, or embryos, are placed in 
the uterus.  Id. 
 41 Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, supra note 21. 
 42 See discussion infra Parts V–VI. 
 43 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. 
 44 Id. at 139–40.  
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brought by several female General Electric employees, the Court ad-
dressed the question of whether Title VII’s prohibition on sex dis-
crimination
45
 applied to pregnancy-based discrimination.
46
  The fe-
male employees at General Electric challenged the company’s 
disability plan, which provided extensive coverage for all “nonoccupa-
tional sickness and accident benefits” but excluded from its coverage 
disabilities arising from pregnancy.
47
 
In reaching its decision, the Gilbert Court relied primarily on its 
decision two years earlier in Geduldig v. Aiello,
48
 in which the Court 
had held that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination un-
der the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
49
  In 
Gilbert, the Court again employed the Geduldig reasoning to conclude 
that the disability plan distinguished not between men and women 
but between pregnant persons and nonpregnant persons of both sex-
es.
50
  Accordingly, the Gilbert Court held that because the nonpreg-
nant class consisted of both men and women, the plan did not consti-
tute sex discrimination on either its face or its impact on women
51
—
even though the Court noted that the category of pregnant persons 
could necessarily include only female employees.
52
  The Court rea-
 
 45 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee regarding the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” 
on the basis of the employee’s sex.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 46 See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 129.  The plaintiffs claimed that General Electric’s refus-
al to pay disability benefits under the company’s insurance plan for time lost because 
of pregnancy and childbirth constituted discrimination on the basis of sex.  Id.  
 47 Id. at 127. 
 48 417 U.S. 484 (1974), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.  In Geduldig, female workers sued the state 
for excluding pregnancy and related medical disabilities from coverage under Cali-
fornia’s mandatory state disability compensation program.  Id. at 486, 489–90.  Un-
der a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection analysis, the Court held that the 
plan’s exclusion of pregnancy disabilities was constitutionally valid because the plan 
did not discriminate between men and women but, rather, between pregnant and 
nonpregnant persons (the latter of which included both men and women).  Id. at 
494, 496 & n.20, 497.  The Court upheld the California disability law that excluded 
insurance for pregnancy-related disabilities.  Id. at 494–97. 
 49 Id. at 494.  
 50 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135 (“‘The lack of identity between the excluded disability 
and gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cur-
sory analysis.  The program divides potential recipients into two groups—pregnant 
women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the 
second includes members of both sexes.’” (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20)). 
 51 Id. at 138–39. 
 52 Id. at 134 (“While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not 
follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classifi-
cation.”). 
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soned that the insurance program covered the “same categories of 
risk”
53
 for both men and women and that pregnancy constituted an 
“an additional risk, unique to women,”
54
 for which employers were not 
required to provide “greater economic benefits.”
55
  In other words, 
the Court held that women were not entitled to benefits greater than 
those provided to men just because they are susceptible to an “extra” 
risk—pregnancy.
56
 
The majority’s opinion in Gilbert produced two dissents, one 
from Justice Brennan and one from Justice Stevens.
57
  In his dissent, 
joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan asserted that the majori-
ty’s reasoning was “fanciful”
58
 and “transparent” 
59 in ignoring the real-
ity that all pregnant persons will necessarily be women.
60
  Justice 
Brennan argued that General Electric’s disability plan violated Title 
VII because excluding coverage on the basis of pregnancy is the same 
as excluding coverage on the basis of sex.
61
  In a separate dissent, Jus-
tice Stevens declared that the disability plan constituted sex discrimi-
nation because “it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily 
differentiates the female from the male.”
62
 
Congress agreed with the Gilbert dissents and prospectively over-
ruled the majority’s decision by adding pregnancy discrimination to 
Title VII’s definition of sex discrimination.
63
  The purpose of Title VII 
is to provide equal employment opportunities to all groups of em-
ployees
64
 and thus prohibit private and public employers from “dis-
criminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
 
 53 Id. at 138. 
 54 Id. at 139. 
 55 Id. at 138, 139 & n.17. 
 56 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138, 139 & n.17. 
 57 Id. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 58 See id. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 59 Id. at 152 & n.5. 
 60 See id. at 149. 
 61 See id. at 160. 
 62 Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161–62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 63 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678, 679 & 
n.17 (1983) (noting that the PDA was designed to overrule the Gilbert decision). 
 64 See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 288 (1987) (emphasiz-
ing that the purpose of Title VII is ‘“to achieve equality of employment opportunities 
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of . 
. . employees over other employees.’” (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 429–430 (1971))). 
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individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
65
  Congress 
legislated that “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”
66
  The second clause of 
the definition states that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all em-
ployment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work.”
67
  This clause mandates equal employ-
ment treatment, including insurance coverage, for pregnancy-related 
conditions as for other disabilities and thus overturns the Supreme 
Court’s specific holding in Gilbert.
68
 
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT POST-PDA ENACTMENT 
While the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether 
women undergoing IVF are protected under the PDA, it has provided 
some guidance regarding the scope and proper interpretation of the 
Act.  The Court has decided three cases addressing the PDA, none of 
which specifically address infertility treatments.
69
  Two of the deci-
sions, however, provide particularly useful guidance to the infertility 
analysis because one of the cases involved the related issue of equality 
 
 65 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) (2006). 
 66 § 2000e(k) (emphasis added). 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678, 679 & n.17.  The Court used legislative histo-
ry to bolster its conclusion that the PDA’s second clause was meant to directly repu-
diate Gilbert.  Id.  For example, the Court cited the remarks of Representative Haw-
kins:  
H.R. 5055 does not really add anything to Title VII as I and, I believe, 
most of my colleagues in Congress when title VII was enacted in 1964 
and amended in 1972, understood the prohibition against sex discrim-
ination in employment.  For, it seems only commonsense, that since 
only women can become pregnant, discrimination against pregnant 
people is necessarily discrimination against women, and that forbid-
ding discrimination based on sex therefore clearly forbids discrimina-
tion based on pregnancy. 
Id. at 679 n.17 (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 10,581 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hawkins)).  
 69 See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 210–11 (1991) (holding that 
employer’s policy prohibiting all fertile women from having jobs involving actual or 
possible lead exposure was facially discriminatory and violated the PDA); Cal. Fed. 
Sav., 479 U.S. at 285, 287–88 (holding that the PDA is the floor beneath which preg-
nancy benefits cannot fall and that state statutes may provide more protection to 
pregnant women); Newport News, 462 U.S. at 683–84 (holding employer’s insurance 
coverage plan discriminatory against male employees and violative of the PDA where 
it provided less extensive benefits for the pregnancy-related conditions of spouses of 
male employees than for other medical conditions of spouses of female employees). 
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of insurance coverage,
70
 and the other addressed discrimination on 
the basis of “potential for pregnancy.”
71
 
A. Pregnancy Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination 
In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,
72
 the Su-
preme Court held that an employer must provide the same level of 
health insurance coverage for the pregnancy-related medical condi-
tions of the spouses of male employees as it does for all other medical 
conditions of the spouses of female employees.
73
  In Newport News, the 
employer’s health insurance plan provided complete coverage for the 
pregnancy-related expenses of its female employees but limited preg-
nancy-related benefits for the spouses of male employees.
74
  The plan 
also provided extensive coverage for all other medical conditions for 
the spouses of female employees.
75
 
The Court followed the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission’s (EEOC) interpretive guidelines, which stated that “if an 
employer’s insurance program covers the medical expenses of spous-
es of female employees, then it must equally cover the medical ex-
penses of spouses of male employees, including those arising from 
pregnancy-related conditions.”
76
  The Court reasoned that although 
the PDA prohibits discrimination against female employees on the 
basis of pregnancy, it never altered Title VII’s original prohibition 
against discrimination on the basis of sex.
77
  Thus, the Court found 
that the employer’s plan discriminated against married male em-
ployees because it provided them less comprehensive coverage than it 
provided for married female employees.
78
 
B. The Definition of Pregnancy Includes the “Potential for Pregnancy” 
In International Union v. Johnson Controls,
79
 the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the employer’s fetal-protection policy constituted 
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
80
  The employer, Johnson 
 
 70 See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 675–76.  
 71 See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 187–88. 
 72 462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
 73 Id. at 684. 
 74 Id. at 671. 
 75 Id. at 672. 
 76 Id. at 673.    
 77 Id. at 684–85. 
 78 Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676.   
 79 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 80 See id. at 190. 
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Controls, Inc., manufactured batteries, in which lead was a primary 
component.
81
  Because of the harmful effects of lead exposure on fe-
tuses, the company implemented a “fetal-protection policy” that ex-
cluded all women who were pregnant or capable of becoming preg-
nant from working in a battery-manufacturing job.
82
  The policy 
required female employees to prove that they were not capable of re-
producing to obtain this particular job.
83
  Both the district court and 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit analyzed the policy as 
facially neutral with a discriminatory effect on women’s employment 
opportunities.
84
  Accordingly, applying the “business necessity test”
85
 
and granting summary judgment in favor of the employer, both 
courts concluded that the employer’s policy was necessary to avoid 
the substantial health risk to the fetus.
86
 
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s holding and 
rejected its application of the business-necessity test.
87
  The Court 
held that the policy was facially discriminatory under the PDA, which 
necessarily constitutes sex discrimination, because it “classified on the 
basis of gender and childbearing capacity, rather than fertility 
alone.”
88
  The policy classified on the basis of gender because it re-
quired only women to prove their lack of reproductive capacity de-
spite evidence that lead exposure adversely affects the male repro-
ductive system; consequently, the policy gave only men a “choice as to 
whether they wish[ed] to risk their reproductive health for a particu-
 
 81 Id.  
 82 Id. at 191–92. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id. at 197–98. 
 85 The business-necessity test is used by courts to determine whether a disparate-
impact claim—in which plaintiffs assert that an employer’s facially neutral policy has 
a discriminatory effect on a protected group—is nonetheless valid because it is justi-
fied by business necessity.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971).  
The business-necessity test includes a three-step inquiry: “whether there is substantial 
health risk to the fetus; whether transmission of the hazard to the fetus occurs only 
through women; and whether there is a less discriminatory alternative equally capa-
ble of preventing the health hazard to the fetus.”  Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 194.  
The Seventh Circuit concluded that there was a substantial health risk to the fetus; 
the evidence of risk from the father’s exposure was speculative and unconvincing; 
and the petitioners waived the issue of less discriminatory alternatives by not suffi-
ciently presenting such alternatives.  Id.   
 86 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197–98. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 198.  
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lar job.”
89
  Furthermore, the policy was also facially discriminatory 
under the PDA
90
 because of its childbearing-capacity classification, 
which excluded employees who were “pregnant or . . . capable of 
bearing children.”
91
  Moreover, the Court noted that “the absence of 
a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy 
into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect.”
92
  Consequently, 
the Court rejected the more lax business-necessity test under which 
facially neutral policies are analyzed and instead addressed whether 
the policy satisfied the narrow bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ) defense to Title VII.
93
 
The BFOQ exception permits sex discrimination “in those cer-
tain instances where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business or enterprise.”
94
  Johnson Controls argued that female sterili-
ty constituted a BFOQ because the battery-manufacturing job com-
promised the safety of the unborn children of its fertile female em-
ployees.
95
  The Court rejected this argument.
96
  Because the 
protection of fetuses was not necessary to the essence of battery man-
ufacturing and because fertile women could perform the essential 
duties of battery manufacturing as efficiently as all other employees, 
Johnson Controls could not establish female sterility as a BFOQ.
97
 
 
 89 Id. at 197.  The Court reasoned that the employer was concerned only with the 
safety of the unborn offspring of its female employees despite potential harms to the 
offspring of male employees as well.  Id. at 198. 
 90 Id. at 198–99. 
 91 See id. at 192. 
 92 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199. 
 93 Id. at 199–200.  
 94 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006). 
 95 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206.   
 96 The Court stressed that the exception applied only in the narrow circums-
tances where sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the woman’s ability to perform 
the job-related activities that go to the “essence” of the employer’s business.  Id.  Ac-
cordingly, in cases where the safety of a third party is at issue, such safety must be an 
essential aspect of the employer’s business, and the woman’s sex, pregnancy, or re-
productive potential must actually interfere with the woman’s ability to ensure the 
safety of those third parties.  Id. at 202–04.  In Johnson Controls, the Court rejected 
female sterility as a BFOQ because the essence of Johnson Controls’ business was bat-
tery manufacturing and not concern for children; thus, the fetal-protection policy 
was not essential to its business.  Id. at 207.  “Concerns about the welfare of the next 
generation [cannot] be considered a part of the ‘essence’ of Johnson Controls’ busi-
ness.”  Id.  The potential fetuses were “neither customers nor third parties whose 
safety [was] essential to the business of battery manufacturing.”  Id. at 203.  Addition-
ally, the status of a woman’s fertility did not relate to, let alone interfere with, her 
ability to perform the job’s duties.  Id. at 206.   
 97 Id.  
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Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Johnson Controls poli-
cy violated Title VII, as amended by the PDA, because the PDA was 
meant “to protect female workers from being treated differently from 
other employees simply because of their capacity to bear children.”
98
  
And in Johnson Controls, the employer determined the eligibility of 
workers based on their reproductive capacity or potential for preg-
nancy, which constituted pregnancy discrimination.
99
 
V. DEFINING PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION: A DIFFICULT TASK 
PRODUCING CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS 
While the Supreme Court has offered some general guidance on 
the scope of the PDA, the task of deciding whether infertility is a 
pregnancy-related condition under the PDA has been largely left to 
the lower federal courts.  The lower courts have taken varying ap-
proaches in interpreting the PDA in the infertility context, which has 
led to confusion and inconsistent results among them.
100
 
A. The Eighth Circuit: Infertility Is Not a Related Medical Condition 
under the PDA 
In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,
101
 the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether infertility was a med-
ical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth within the meaning 
of the PDA.
102
  It held that infertility fell outside the PDA’s protection 
 
Fertile women . . . participate in the manufacture of batteries as effi-
ciently as anyone else.  Johnson Controls’ professed moral and ethical 
concerns about the welfare of the next generation do not suffice to es-
tablish a BFOQ of female sterility.  Decisions about the welfare of fu-
ture children must be left to the parents . . .  rather than to employers 
who hire those parents. 
Id. 
 98 Id. at 205. 
“Under this bill, the treatment of pregnant women in covered em-
ployment must focus not on their condition alone but on the actual ef-
fects of that condition on their ability to work. Pregnant women who 
are able to work must be permitted to work on the same conditions as 
other employees . . . . 
. . . . . 
“ . . . [U]nder this bill, employers will no longer be permitted to force 
women who become pregnant to stop working regardless of their abili-
ty to continue.” 
Id.  (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 4–6 (1977)). 
 99 Id. at 211. 
 100 See discussion infra Part VI. 
 101 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 102 Id. at 679. 
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because infertility did not include pregnancy, childbirth, or a related 
medical condition.
103
 
The plaintiff in Krauel was diagnosed with endometriosis and, as 
a result, was unable to conceive naturally.
104
  The plaintiff-employee 
paid for her own infertility treatment because her employer’s medical 
benefits plan did not provide coverage for treatment of infertility 
problems.
105
  The plan excluded insurance coverage for both male 
and female infertility treatments.
106
  When the plaintiff’s employer 
denied reimbursement for her infertility treatments, the plaintiff 
filed suit and alleged that the employer’s denial of coverage for infer-
tility treatments violated the PDA.
107
  The plaintiff argued that infertil-
ity was a medical condition related to pregnancy, and therefore, the 
employer’s refusal to provide coverage for infertility treatments was 
discrimination on the basis of a “related medical condition” under 
the PDA.
108
  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument and affirmed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the em-
ployer.
109
 
The court employed a canon of statutory construction, ejusdem 
generis,
110
 meaning that when a general term follows a specific term, 
the general term should be understood as referring to matters similar 
to those in the specific terms.
111
  Here, the general term was “related 
medical condition,” and the specific term was “pregnancy or child-
birth.”  Consequently, the court held that the plain language of the 
PDA did not suggest that “related medical conditions” should be ap-
plied to conditions outside the context of pregnancy and child-
birth.
112
  The court concluded that, because infertility, which “pre-
vents conception,” is “strikingly different” from pregnancy and 
childbirth, “which occur after conception,” it was not a “related med-
ical condition” as contemplated by the PDA.
113
 
 
 103 Id. at 679–80. 
 104 Id. at 675–76. 
 105 Id. at 676. 
 106 Id. at 680.  
 107 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679. 
 108 Id.  
 109 Id. at 681.  
 110 The term ejusdem generis means “of the same kind.”  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
253 (2000). 
 111 Id. at 253–54. 
 112 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679. 
 113 Id.  
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The court distinguished Johnson Controls, in which the Supreme 
Court held that sex discrimination included discrimination on the 
basis of “potential pregnancy.”
114
  While “potential pregnancy” is a 
gender-specific medical condition because only women can become 
pregnant, infertility is gender neutral because it affects both men and 
women.
115
  Accordingly, the court held that the employer’s refusal to 
cover the cost of infertility treatments was not sex discrimination be-
cause both men and women are affected by infertility.
116
  The court 
further supported its holding by stating that the fact that neither the 
legislative history of the PDA nor the EEOC guidelines made any ex-
plicit reference to infertility treatment suggests that infertility is out-
side the purview of the PDA’s protection.
117
 
Finally, the Krauel court expressly rejected the reasoning in Pa-
courek v. Inland Steel Co.,
118
 in which the District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois held that infertility is a medical condition re-
lated to pregnancy for purposes of the PDA.
119
  The court in Krauel 
found the result in Pacourek unpersuasive for two reasons.  First, the 
district court relied too heavily on the legislative history of the PDA, 
in which infertility is not explicitly mentioned,
120
 and second, the de-
fendant in Pacourek, unlike the defendant in Krauel, did not concede 
that the employer policy was gender-neutral and applicable to all in-
fertile employees, both male and female.
121
  Because the policy at is-
 
 114 Id. at 680.  
Potential pregnancy, unlike infertility, is a medical condition that is 
sex-related because only women can become pregnant.  In this case, 
because the policy of denying insurance benefits for treatment of fertil-
ity problems applies to both female and male workers and thus is 
gender-neutral, Johnson Controls is inapposite. 
Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id.  
 117 Id. at 679–80. 
 118 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 119 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 80. 
 120 Id.  The Pacourek court cited legislative history to support the notion that Con-
gress intended for the PDA to provide broad protection to women against any and all 
employment discrimination based on gender.  Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1402.  The 
court quoted Senator Harrison Williams’s statement, “‘[T]he overall effect of dis-
crimination against women because they might become pregnant, or do become 
pregnant, is to relegate women in general, and pregnant women in particular, to a 
second-class status. . . .’”  Id. (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 29,385 (1977)).  The Pacourek 
court also relied on Representative Ronald Sarasin’s statement that the PDA gives a 
woman “‘the right . . . to be financially and legally protected before, during, and after 
her pregnancy.’”  Id. (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 38,574 (1978)). 
 121 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680.  In Krauel, the insurance policy denied benefits to all in-
fertile employees.  Id.  In Pacourek, on the other hand, the plaintiff claimed that she 
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sue in Krauel applied to all infertile employees regardless of sex, the 
court held that it was gender-neutral and thus did not violate the 
PDA.
122
 
B. The Second Circuit: Providing Less Complete Coverage for Female 
Infertility Does Not Run Afoul of the PDA 
In Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.,
123
 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals addressed the same issue that was presented in Krauel—whether 
an employer’s denial of health coverage for infertility treatments that 
can be performed only on women violated the PDA.
124
  The court 
held that because the employer’s health-benefits plan’s exclusion of 
surgical impregnation procedures disadvantaged infertile male and 
female employees equally, the plan did not violate Title VII, as 
amended by the PDA.
125
 
During the course of her four years of employment at Franklin 
Covey Sales, Inc., the plaintiff-employee, an infertile female, under-
went several infertility procedures, including IVF, to achieve preg-
nancy with her husband.
126
  The plaintiff-employee sued her employer 
after being denied coverage for the cost of her infertility treat-
ments—IVF, intrauterine insemination, and injectable fertility 
drugs—under her employer’s self-insured health-benefits plan (“the 
Plan”).
127
  The Plan entitled employees to coverage for “medically ne-
cessary procedures,” including a variety of infertility products and 
procedures and surgical infertility treatments.
128
  But the Plan ex-
pressly excluded surgical impregnation procedures, including IVF 
and intrauterine insemination.
129
  The plaintiff claimed that the Plan 
violated several statutes, including the PDA, because it provided infe-
rior coverage for infertility treatments than for illnesses unrelated to 
pregnancy.
130
 
 
was terminated for needing sick leave due to a medical condition that rendered her 
infertile.  Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1397. 
 122 Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680.   
 123 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 124 Id. at 340. 
 125 Id. at 346. 
 126 Id. at 341. 
 127 Id. at 340–42. 
 128 Id. at 341 (“Examples of covered surgical infertility treatments include[d] pro-
cedures to remedy conditions such as variococeles (varicose veins in the testicles 
causing low sperm count), blockages of the vas deferens, endometriosis, and tubal 
occlusions.”). 
 129 Saks, 316 F.3d at 341.  
 130 Id. at 342. 
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Despite noting that the phrase “related medical conditions” en-
compassed more than pregnancy itself—a concession that the Krauel 
court was unwilling to make—the court rejected the plaintiff’s PDA 
claim.
131
  The court framed the issue as infertility, separate and apart 
from its treatment.
132
  As a result, the court found that Johnson Controls 
provided support for its interpretation of the PDA—that discrimina-
tion based on “fertility alone” and, by implication, infertility alone—
does not violate the PDA because infertility affects men and women 
in equal numbers.
133
  Accordingly, the court concluded that the Plan 
did not violate the PDA because its denial of coverage for surgical 
impregnation procedures constituted discrimination based on fertili-
ty alone and thus disadvantaged both male and female employees 
equally.
134
  The court further noted the anomalous implications of in-
cluding infertility within the protection of the PDA—that only infer-
tile women would be part of the protected class, even though the af-
fected class includes both men and women.
135
  Therefore, the court 
held that infertility is not a pregnancy-related condition under the 
PDA and that infertility discrimination does not violate the PDA.
136
 
C. The Seventh Circuit: The Issue is Not Infertility Alone 
In a case of first impression, Hall v. Nalco Co., the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals confronted the issue of whether the plaintiff-
employee, Hall, stated a cognizable PDA claim against her employer 
who terminated her after she took time off to undergo IVF.
137
  The 
court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
employer and held that an adverse employment action based on a 
gender-specific infertility treatment, such as IVF, constitutes sex dis-
crimination under Title VII, as amended by the PDA.
138
 
Hall was a sales secretary for Nalco Company when, in March 
2003, she requested a leave of absence to undergo IVF treatments.
139
  
Hall’s supervisor approved the leave.
140
  Hall’s IVF cycle was unsuc-
 
 131 Id. at 345–46. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 346. 
 134 Id.  
 135 Saks, 316 F.3d at 346. 
 136 Id. at 345–46. 
 137 Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 138 Id. at 649. 
 139 Id. at 645.  The court noted that each IVF cycle takes several weeks to complete 
and that several cycles may be required to achieve pregnancy.  Id. at 645–46. 
 140 Id. at 646. 
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cessful, however, and in July 2003, she requested another leave of ab-
sence to begin that August.
141
  Shortly after her request, Hall’s super-
visor told her that the sales office was merging with another office 
and that her position would be terminated as a result.
142
  Hall’s super-
visor also told her that “her termination ‘was in [her] best interest 
due to [her] health condition.’”
143
  Prior to her termination, Hall’s 
supervisor discussed her potential termination with the company’s 
employee-relations manager whose notes from the conversation re-
ferred to Hall’s “absenteeism—infertility treatments” and stated that 
Hall “missed a lot of work due to health.”
144
 
Hall filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC, and she sub-
sequently sued her employer and alleged discrimination on the basis 
of sex in violation of Title VII.
145
  In her complaint, Hall alleged that 
she was terminated for being “a member of a protected class, female 
with a pregnancy-related condition, infertility.”
146
  The district court 
found that Hall did not state a claim cognizable under the PDA and 
granted summary judgment to her employer.
147
  The court reasoned 
that infertility is a gender-neutral condition, and thus, infertile wom-
en are not a protected class under the PDA.
148
 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and held 
that Hall presented a cognizable PDA claim.
149
  First, the court re-
jected the district court’s characterization of the issue as “infertility 
alone”
150
 as well as Hall’s theory that infertile women are a protected 
class under the PDA.
151
  The PDA, the court held, was not meant to 
create a new protected class or to create “new rights or remedies” but 
was intended only to “clarif[y] the scope of Title VII by recognizing 
certain inherently gender-specific characteristics that may not form 
the basis for disparate treatment of employees.”
152
  Thus, the Hall 
court recognized that classifications based solely on the gender-
 
 141 Id.  
 142 Id.  
 143 Hall, 534 F.3d at 646.  
 144 Id.  
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Hall, 534 F.3d at 649. 
 150 Id. at 648. 
 151 Id. at 649 n.3.  
 152 Id. at 647. 
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neutral condition of infertility are not prohibited by the PDA.
153
  To 
this extent, Hall is consistent with Krauel and Saks.
154
 
Relying on Johnson Controls, the Hall court stated that, even 
where infertility is at issue, the “employer conduct complained of 
must actually be gender neutral to pass muster.”
155
  Here, the court held, 
the issue was not infertility alone but also whether the employer con-
duct was gender-neutral in response to the employee’s need to un-
dergo IVF.
156
  To assess whether an employer action violates Title VII, 
the court reiterated the test for sex discrimination: “whether the em-
ployer action in question treats an employee ‘in a manner which but 
for that person’s sex would be different.’”
157
 
The court analogized the employer conduct in this case to the 
employer conduct in Johnson Controls, where the employer barred on-
ly fertile women from employment even though the lead exposure 
affected the fertility of both men and women.
158
  The court concluded 
that Nalco’s conduct suffered the same defect as the employer con-
duct in Johnson Controls—that the employer policy “did not classify 
based on the gender-neutral characteristic of fertility alone, but ra-
ther on the gender-specific characteristic of childbearing capacity, or 
‘potential for pregnancy,’ and was therefore invalid under the 
PDA.”
159
 
The court reasoned that where an employer bases an employ-
ment decision on an employee’s absences related to IVF treatments, 
 
 153 Id. at 648. 
The [Johnson Controls] Court held the policy was invalid under the PDA 
because it “classifie[d] on the basis of gender and childbearing capaci-
ty, rather than fertility alone.”  Implicit in this holding is that classifica-
tions based on “fertility alone”—and by like implication, infertility 
alone—are not prohibited by the PDA, which reaches only gender-
specific classifications.  As the Second Circuit noted in Saks, this con-
clusion is necessary to reconcile the PDA with Title VII because 
“[i]ncluding infertility within the PDA’s protection as a ‘related medi-
cal condition[]’ would result in the anomaly of defining a class that si-
multaneously includes equal numbers of both sexes and yet is somehow 
vulnerable to sex discrimination.” 
Id. (quoting Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003) (footnotes 
and citation omitted)).  
 154 See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
 155 Hall, 534 F.3d at 648.  
 156 Id. at 648–49. 
 157 Id. at 647 (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 
(1978)). 
 158 Id. at 648–49. 
 159 Id. at 648 (quoting Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198–99 
(1991)). 
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such decisions are not gender-neutral because IVF is a surgical im-
pregnation procedure that can be performed only on women.
160
  Em-
ployees who undergo IVF will necessarily always be women because 
only women have the capacity to bear children.
161
  Thus, the court 
concluded that “Hall was terminated not for the gender-neutral con-
dition of infertility, but rather for the gender-specific quality of child-
bearing capacity.”
162
 
Although the court did not reach the merits of the case, as to 
whether Hall was terminated on the legitimate basis of restructuring 
or on her absence for IVF treatments, it did suggest the latter because 
of the timing of her termination—shortly after her first failed IVF 
cycle and request for another leave of absence—and the employee-
relations manager’s notes expressly referring to her IVF treatments.
163
  
The court concluded that Hall’s allegations presented a cognizable 
Title VII claim “[b]ecause adverse employment action based on 
childbearing capacity will always result in ‘treatment of a person in a 
manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.’”
164
 
VI. MAKING SENSE OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT IN LIGHT 
OF KRAUEL, SAKS, AND HALL 
The conflict between the courts arises from a threshold ques-
tion—how to frame the issue.
165
  In Krauel and Saks, the courts framed 
 
 160 Id. at 648–49. 
 161 Hall, 534 F.3d at 648–49. 
 162 Id. at 649; see also Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for Ne. 
Ill. Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316, 320 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that female employee 
stated a claim under Title VII because she was terminated for undergoing fertility 
treatment and that her termination was thus based on her capacity to become preg-
nant). 
 163 Hall, 534 F.3d at 649.   
 164 Id. (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 
(1978)). 
 165 See also Cintra D. Bentley, Comment, A Pregnant Pause: Are Women Who Undergo 
Fertility Treatment to Achieve Pregnancy Within the Scope of Title VII’s Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 391, 416 (1998). 
The problem stems from how this issue is approached and subsequent-
ly framed.  Proponents of including women undergoing fertility treat-
ment within the PDA aver that the diagnosis of infertility cannot be bi-
furcated from its treatment.  This belief allows proponents to frame the 
issue as: whether women undergoing fertility treatment are included in 
the scope of the PDA.  Conversely, because opponents do not, or can-
not, acknowledge that the two aspects of infertility cannot be bifur-
cated, opponents frame the issue as: whether women who are infertile 
are included in the scope of the PDA.  This explains why a court may 
conclude that the phrase “treatment for a medical condition related to 
pregnancy” does not include women undergoing fertility treatment: 
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the issue as whether infertility is a “related medical condition” under 
the PDA.
166
  Because infertility is gender neutral, the courts answered 
in the negative.
167
  The Hall court, on the other hand, did not sepa-
rate infertility from the context of IVF; instead, the court framed the 
issue as whether women undergoing IVF can present a cognizable 
claim under the PDA.
168
  The Hall court noted that IVF is related to 
pregnancy because it involves the “potential for pregnancy” and re-
quires that the person receiving treatment have childbearing capaci-
ty.
169
  By ignoring the connection between IVF and childbearing ca-
pacity, the Krauel and Saks courts viewed infertility in a vacuum.
170
 
A. The Krauel and Saks Decisions Only Scratch the Surface of the 
Infertility Issue 
In Hall, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Krauel and Saks, each 
of which involved insurance coverage for infertility treatments rather 
than the termination of a female employee undergoing IVF.
171
  While 
the Seventh Circuit did not necessarily disagree with the decisions 
reached by the Eighth and Second Circuits in Krauel and Saks,
172
 re-
spectively, its reasoning conflicts with certain aspects of the argu-
ments employed in these cases. 
The Krauel court dismissed the plaintiff’s PDA claim because it 
held that infertility is not related to pregnancy.
173
  The court reasoned 
that infertility, which prevents conception, is not a condition related 
 
the condition of infertility is being considered outside the context of 
diagnosis and treatment. 
Id. 
 166 See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(“[T]he issue before us is whether the District Court properly determined that 
treatment of infertility is not treatment of a medical condition related to pregnancy 
or childbirth.”); see also Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“Whether the PDA’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and 
‘related medical conditions’ extends to discrimination on the basis of infertility.”). 
 167 See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680; see also Saks, 316 F.3d at 346. 
 168 See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The district court’s 
emphasis on this issue of ‘infertility alone’ is therefore misplaced in the factual con-
text of this case.”). 
 169 See id.  
 170 See Bentley, supra note 165, at 416–17 (analyzing the Krauel case and conclud-
ing that “consideration of infertility in this vacuum is the root of the most common 
objection to finding that women undergoing fertility treatment are within the scope 
of the PDA: that infertility is a gender-neutral condition”).   
 171 See Hall, 534 F.3d at 648. 
 172 See id. 
 173 Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996). 
CUSHING_FINAL FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:12 PM 
1718 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1697 
to pregnancy and childbirth, which occur post-conception.
174
  The 
Krauel court drew a bright line at pregnancy to implicate the PDA; es-
sentially, the court made a blanket rule that infertility cannot serve as 
the basis for pregnancy discrimination because it is not “related to” 
pregnancy.  This kind of analysis, however, is superficial because it 
looks only at the condition of infertility and stops there instead of al-
so looking at infertility in the context of both the treatment and em-
ployer action at issue.  Additionally, as the Hall court noted, this rea-
soning was nullified by Johnson Controls, in which the Supreme Court 
held that the PDA applies to classifications based on “potential for 
pregnancy” in addition to actual pregnancy.
175
  Contrary to Krauel’s 
rationale, a woman’s protection under the PDA does not exist only 
during her nine months of pregnancy.
176
  A woman is part of the pro-
tected class whenever an employer action adversely affects her on the 
basis of a biological difference, such as the capacity to become preg-
nant, regardless of temporal considerations.
177
 
The Krauel line of reasoning is similar to that employed by the 
majority in Gilbert.  Krauel created two classes, fertile and infertile em-
ployees, as the Gilbert majority differentiated between pregnant and 
nonpregnant employees.
178
  In both cases, the courts upheld the em-
ployment policy because the class claiming discrimination included 
both men and women.
179
  As Justice Stevens wrote in his Gilbert dis-
sent, with which Congress agreed, the flaw in this reasoning is viewing 
the condition at issue, pregnancy in Gilbert and infertility in Krauel, in 
a “vacuum” instead of looking at the condition in a practical con-
text—that pregnant persons can only be women and infertile persons 
 
 174 Id. at 679–80.  The Eighth Circuit extended its Krauel rule to the issue of con-
traception in In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litigation, 479 F.3d 936, 942 
(8th Cir. 2007).  Using the same statutory construction, the Union Pacific court held 
that contraception is not a medical condition associated with “pregnancy” or “child-
birth.”  Id.  The court reasoned that contraception, like infertility, prevents concep-
tion, and pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions can occur only after 
conception.  Id.    
 175 Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 648 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 176 See generally Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (holding 
that classifying groups on the basis of potential for pregnancy is the same as sex dis-
crimination). 
 177 See Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 469–70 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (holding than an employee need not be pregnant at the time of the dis-
crimination to bring a claim under the PDA).  
 178 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134–35 (1976), superseded by statute, 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076; Krauel v. 
Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996).  
 179 Gilbert, 428 U,S. at 136–40, 145–46; Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680. 
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undergoing IVF can only be women.
180
  In the case of infertility, the 
practical context includes which gender the infertility treatments af-
fect and how employers treat their employees with regard to gender-
specific infertility treatments. 
The Second Circuit in Saks applied the Krauel reasoning to 
uphold an employer plan that provided complete insurance coverage 
for male infertility treatments but excluded coverage for surgical im-
pregnation procedures.
181
  Like the Eighth Circuit in Krauel, the 
Second Circuit held that “infertility standing alone does not fall with-
in the meaning of the phrase ‘related medical conditions’ under the 
PDA.”
182
  The court refused to include infertility within the PDA be-
cause it would create a protected class—infertile persons—which in-
cludes both men and women.
183
  In Saks, however, the plaintiff 
claimed that the employer plan provided complete surgical infertility 
coverage for male employees but incomplete coverage for female 
employees.
184
  Thus, the issue stated in Hall was not the gender-
neutral condition of infertility alone but rather the gender-specific 
condition of childbearing capacity.
185
  The health-benefits plan in Saks 
fell within the PDA because it discriminated against employees on the 
basis of childbearing capacity by excluding coverage for infertility 
treatments performed only on women on account of their childbear-
ing capacity.
186
  Making blanket assertions that infertility is or is not 
included within the purview of the PDA allows courts to avoid the 
specific employer action at issue and the class of persons it affects. 
Ironically, the Seventh Circuit would probably have come to the 
same conclusion—albeit employing a different analysis—as the 
Eighth Circuit did in Krauel.  The Seventh Circuit agreed that dis-
crimination on the basis of infertility alone, a gender-neutral condi-
tion, does not violate the PDA.
187
  Therefore, if an employer, like the 
one in Krauel, provides no coverage for infertility treatments or ter-
minates an employee merely for being infertile, then the issue is in-
fertility alone and the employer does not violate the PDA.  On the 
 
 180 See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161–62.  
 181 Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 346–47 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 182 Id. at 346. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 342.  The court disagreed with the plaintiff’s contention that the employ-
er plan provided inferior coverage for female infertility.  Id. at 346.  It stated, howev-
er, that even if it did agree with the plaintiff that the plan provided inferior coverage 
for women, “such inferior coverage would not violate the PDA.”  Id.    
 185 See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 186 See Saks, 316 F.3d at 342.   
 187 Hall, 534 F.3d at 648. 
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other hand, if the employer provides coverage for male infertility 
treatments but not for female infertility treatments, like the employer 
in Saks, then the issue is not infertility alone because the employer is 
discriminating on the basis of childbearing capacity, a gender-specific 
condition.  Likewise, if an employer terminates an employee for the 
reason that she is undergoing IVF, then the employer is discriminat-
ing on the basis of childbearing capacity because it is that capacity 
which necessarily requires the woman, not the man, to undergo 
IVF.
188
  In sum, courts must conduct more than a superficial analy-
sis—examining infertility only on its surface—and instead more close-
ly scrutinize infertility in the context of its treatment to determine 
whether the employer action is gender neutral. 
B. The Limitations of the PDA Even After Hall 
The Hall decision provides and promotes greater protection 
from adverse employment actions on the basis of gender-specific in-
fertility treatments by highlighting the shallow analysis with which 
other courts have addressed the infertility issue.  But the practical 
significance of the decision may be disappointing for many working 
women undergoing IVF. 
First, employment actions based on infertility alone are not un-
lawful because they affect men and women equally.
189
  Only where an 
employer takes into consideration a woman’s gender-specific charac-
teristic, reproductive capacity, in taking adverse actions against her 
does impermissible gender discrimination arise.
190
  Accordingly, em-
ployers may lawfully exclude insurance coverage for all infertility 
treatments because such an employer action is gender-neutral—that 
is, the exclusion affects men and women in equal proportion and is 
not based upon any gender-specific quality.
191
  Both men and women 
will presumably have to face this employer policy in equal measure by 
paying out of their pockets for infertility treatments for themselves or 
their spouses.
192
  In fact, an employer will invite sex discrimination 
claims from infertile male employees if it provides insurance coverage 
 
 188 Id. at 648–49. 
 189 Id. at 648. 
 190 See id. at 648–49. 
 191 See, e.g., Saks, 316 F.3d at 346. 
 192 See id. at 347 (“[M]ale and female employees afflicted by infertility are equally 
disadvantaged by the exclusion of surgical impregnation procedures . . . . “).   
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for female infertility treatments only.
193
  Therefore, the PDA does not 
compel employers to provide coverage for IVF.
194
 
In contrast, adverse employer actions, such as demotion or ter-
mination, based not on infertility alone but rather on infertility 
treatment that can be performed only on women because of their 
childbearing capacity—such as IVF—could lead to a valid PDA 
claim.
195
  Men and women do not have to face this employer action in 
equal measure; women bear this burden because men do not have to 
take extensive time off to undergo IVF treatments.
196
  Additionally, 
whereas women who undergo IVF may be viewed by their employer as 
potentially pregnant (thus requiring insurance coverage and more 
time off in the future), men can never be viewed this way.
197
  There-
fore, for employers to take adverse employment action against wom-
en on the grounds that they are taking time off to undergo IVF is un-
lawful discrimination. 
Even though women who are terminated for undergoing IVF 
may have a valid PDA claim, the impact of the Hall decision is further 
limited by the fact that Title VII requires equal treatment, not better 
treatment.
198
  Unfortunately, even though Hall may seem like a victory 
 
 193 The Supreme Court has held that both male and female employees are pro-
tected under the PDA because the PDA does not change Title VII’s original prohibi-
tion against sex discrimination.  Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 681–82 (1983); see Katherine E. Abel, Comment, The Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act and Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment: An Inconceivable Union, 
37 CONN. L. REV. 819, 846–47 (2005) (“Congress simply could not have intended the 
PDA to serve as a statute that in effect discriminates against infertile male employees 
by providing superior coverage to infertile female employees.”). 
 194 If the medical condition at issue is gender neutral, as is infertility, and the em-
ployer’s action is gender-neutral and it applies its policy equally to all of its em-
ployees, then it does not violate the PDA because it is based on infertility alone.  See 
Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 195 See id. at 649. 
 196 See id. at 648–49 (“Employees terminated for taking time off to undergo IVF—
just like those terminated for taking time off to give birth or receive other pregnancy-
related care—will always be women”); see also Bentley, supra note 165, at 423. 
 197 See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1994) 
(holding that “[d]iscrimination against an employee because she intends to, is trying 
to, or simply has the potential to become pregnant is . . . illegal discrimination”). 
 198 Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 291 (1987) (holding that 
although the PDA requires equal treatment, not better treatment, for pregnant em-
ployees, state laws can require better treatment); see Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne 
L. Rapp, The Impact of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act on the Workplace—From a Legal 
and Social Perspective, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 93, 110–11 (2005). 
The protections afforded by the PDA, however, are limited by its prom-
ise of equal—but not special—treatment. Not all adverse employment 
actions taken against pregnant women (or women affected by preg-
nancy-related conditions) are prohibited by the PDA. Specifically, fed-
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for infertile women, its impact is restricted because the employer 
does not commit discrimination if the employer would have fired any 
employee under similar circumstances.  “The Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act requires the employer to ignore an employee’s pregnancy, 
but . . . not her absence from work, unless the employer overlooks the 
comparable absences of nonpregnant employees in which event it 
would not be ignoring pregnancy after all.” 
199
  For example, if the 
employer would have fired a male employee for taking time off to 
undergo cosmetic surgery, then a female employee terminated for 
absenteeism related to IVF will likely not be successful in bringing a 
PDA claim.  Only where an employer singles out a gender-specific 
procedure like IVF for adverse employment treatment does a viable 
claim of sex discrimination arise.  A final limitation of the Hall deci-
sion is that its effects are potentially restricted to those women living 
in the Seventh Circuit.  Thus, the PDA does not provide the kind of 
broad protection that women need when they are trying to build a 
family through IVF. 
VII. FEDERAL LEGISLATION IS STILL NECESSARY AFTER HALL 
Two separate forms of federal legislation are still necessary after 
Hall.  First, Hall highlighted the need for Congress to clarify the defi-
nition of “related medical conditions” under the PDA so that women 
can achieve uniform results when they sue their employers for taking 
adverse employment actions against them on the basis of absences in 
connection with infertility treatments.
200
  Second, and more impor-
tantly, federal legislation such as the Family Building Act of 2009
201
 is 
necessary to mandate infertility insurance so that infertile couples can 
afford to experience one of life’s greatest joys—have children.  Cur-
rently, the PDA, the ADA, and the FMLA provide some protection 
against adverse employment actions, but they do not provide much 
hope for requiring infertility insurance.
202
 
 
eral law “only requires that pregnant employees be treated the same as 
other employees similar in their ability or inability to work.” 
Id. (quoting William G. Phelps, What Constitutes Termination of Employee Due to Pregnan-
cy in Violation of Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendment to Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k), in 130 A.L.R. FED. 473 (1996)). 
 199 Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted).   
 200 See discussion infra Part VII.A. 
 201 See discussion infra Part VII.D. 
 202 See discussion infra Parts VII.B–C. 
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A. The PDA Should Be Clarified but Would Still Not Require Infertility 
Insurance 
Since the enactment of the PDA, the judiciary has grappled with 
how to properly interpret which “related medical conditions” fall 
within its scope.  Because infertility is a significant unsettled area of 
law within PDA jurisprudence, PDA compliance is more complex and 
confusing for both employers and employees.  This confusion is re-
flected in the significant rise in PDA charges filed with the EEOC 
since 1997.
203
  As the number of PDA charges steadily increase, the 
judiciary is being asked to play the central role in protecting women 
from employment discrimination. 
Infertile women are essentially asking the courts to determine 
two issues: first, whether the PDA can be used as a means of compel-
ling an employer to provide insurance coverage for infertility treat-
ments;
204
 and second, whether the PDA can be used as a tool to seek 
damages against an employer who has taken an adverse employment 
action against a woman for taking time off to undergo infertility 
treatment.
205
  Unfortunately, the federal courts cannot give a clear an-
swer on either issue, and the litigation surrounding the PDA has re-
sulted in a lack of uniformity among the courts in regard to the scope 
of “related medical conditions” under the PDA.
206
 
Because of the magnitude and complexity of pregnancy discrim-
ination issues today,
207
 the courts are not the appropriate forum to 
 
 203 The EEOC received 6196 charges of pregnancy-based discrimination in 2009, a 
nearly 56% increase from 3977 charges in 1997.  See U.S. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Comm’n, Pregnancy Discrimination Charges, EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 
1997–FY 2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/pregnancy.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2010).   
 204 See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 340–42 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 205 See e.g., Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 206 Compare Saks, 316 F.3d at 346 (holding “[t]hat infertility standing alone does 
not fall within the meaning of the phrase ‘related medical conditions’ under the 
PDA”), and Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679–80 (holding “[t]hat the District Court properly 
concluded that infertility is outside of the PDA’s protection because it is not preg-
nancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition”), with Hall, 534 F.3d at 648–49 
(discussing how discrimination on the basis of childbearing capacity is prohibited by 
the PDA).  
 207 In addition to infertility treatments, cases involving the scope of the PDA re-
garding contraception have been hotly debated.  The lower federal courts have been 
reaching divergent decisions when considering contraception.  Compare Cooley v. 
Daimler Chrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979, 984–85 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (holding that 
denying insurance coverage for a prescription medication that allows women to con-
trol their potential for pregnancy is a sex-based exclusion under the PDA), and 
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding 
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shape the contours of the PDA.  Having a child is a major life event 
that should not hinge on a court’s use of a particular canon of statu-
tory interpretation, framing of the issue, or survey of legislative histo-
ry that does not address the specific pregnancy-related issues that are 
currently important.  The level of delicacy and controversy surround-
ing these issues requires a uniform approach developed by Congress.  
The only equitable and practical way to develop guidance defining 
the responsibilities of employers and the rights of women in the 
workplace is through legislation or regulations clarifying the meaning 
of “related medical conditions” under the PDA. 
Such clarifying legislation would achieve consistency for similarly 
situated plaintiffs, reduce the number of PDA charges filed each year, 
and follow the broader and more practical approach espoused in 
Hall.  But even if Congress prohibits employer discrimination against 
women for undergoing gender-specific infertility treatments, it would 
likely protect women only from adverse employment actions taken 
against them for absenteeism arising from infertility treatments be-
cause only women have to miss work to undergo surgical impregna-
tion procedures.  As for insurance coverage, the PDA has never been 
interpreted to require insurance coverage for such treatments as long 
as employers offer the same coverage to all of their employees.
208
 
B. Little Hope for Infertility Insurance Under the ADA and the FMLA 
Women undergoing IVF may have an alternative avenue for fi-
nancial relief under the ADA.  The ADA prohibits employers from 
discriminating against qualified individuals on the basis of disabili-
ty.
209
  The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities.”
210
  
In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court held that reproduction is a 
major life activity.
211
  Thus, plaintiff-employees may sue their employ-
 
that excluding prescription contraceptives from insurance coverage was sex discrim-
ination under the PDA), with In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 
F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that “the PDA does not require coverage of 
contraception because contraception is not ‘related to’ pregnancy for PDA purposes 
and is gender-neutral”).  
 208 See discussion supra Part VI.B.  
 209 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).  “The term ‘qualified individual’ means an indi-
vidual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”  Id. § 
12111(8). 
 210 Id. § 12102(2)(A). 
 211 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998).   
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ers under the ADA on the theory that infertility is a disability impair-
ing a major life activity—reproduction.
212
 
The ADA may provide a successful cause of action where the 
employee is suing the employer for taking an adverse employment ac-
tion against her for taking time off to treat her disability.
213
  For ex-
ample, a jury could find that granting Hall’s requests for time off is a 
“reasonable accommodation” that her employer must make.
214
  The 
ADA, however, is not likely to provide an impetus for employers to 
provide insurance coverage for infertility treatments.  As with the 
PDA, employers do not violate the ADA as long as they offer the same 
coverage for all employees, even if that means no coverage is offered 
to anyone.
215
 
Likewise, claims brought under the FMLA
216
 would suffer the 
same fate.  The FMLA entitles individuals who cannot perform their 
regular job functions because of a “serious health condition”
217
 to 
twelve weeks of leave as well as restoration of their former position—
or an equivalent position—upon returning to work.
218
  The FMLA 
 
 212 See, e.g., LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763 (W.D. Mich. 
2001).  In LaPorta, the plaintiff employee asserted the ADA as one of her claims 
against her employer for terminating her after she took time off to undergo infertili-
ty treatment.  Id.    
 213 See, e.g., id. at 769–70.  The LaPorta court denied summary judgment to the 
employer on the issue of whether the employer wrongfully terminated the infertile 
employee on the basis of her absences from work to undergo infertility treatment be-
cause the ADA gave the employee the right to “reasonable accommodations” for her 
disability of infertility.  Id.  Thus, the court recognized that the plaintiff had a cogniz-
able ADA claim against her employer.  Id. 
 214 See, e.g., id.  The ADA requires employers to make “reasonable accommoda-
tions to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual 
with a disability.”  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006).   
 215 See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (re-
jecting the plaintiff’s ADA claim because the employer’s refusal to provide infertility 
insurance “d[id] not offer infertile people less pregnancy and fertility-related cover-
age than it offer[ed] to fertile people”), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 316 F.3d 337 
(2d Cir. 2003); see also Jessica L. Hawkins, Note, Separating Fact from Fiction: Mandated 
Insurance Coverage of Infertility Treatments, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 203, 213 (2007) 
(“[S]o long as insurers and employers offer the same insurance coverage to all its 
employees, they do not violate the ADA by refusing to cover infertility treatments.”).  
 216 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006). 
 217 “The term ‘serious health condition’ means an illness, injury, impairment, or 
physical or mental condition that involves—(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, 
or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care pro-
vider.”  § 2611(11). 
 218 § 2612(a)(1)(D) (“[A]n eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 
workweeks of leave during any 12-month period . . . [b]ecause of a serious health 
condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position 
of such employee.”); § 2614(a).   
CUSHING_FINAL FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:12 PM 
1726 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1697 
protects women whose IVF procedure is successful because the sta-
tute expressly authorizes employee leave for the birth of a child.
219
  
But whether the FMLA can protect women against adverse employ-
ment actions for the actual process of undergoing IVF is unclear.  
Such protection depends on the facts of the case—for example, how 
severely the infertility treatments are impacting the woman’s ability to 
function—as well as the court’s interpretation of what constitutes a 
“serious health condition.”  Moreover, the FMLA does not require 
employers to provide infertility insurance but rather requires only 
unpaid leave for eligible employees.
220
  Therefore, infertile women 
should turn to the legislature to create a new federal mandate rather 
than ask the judiciary to broadly interpret the express terms of al-
ready-existing laws—a task many courts are hesitant to do.
221
 
C. The Limitations of State Law Coverage for Infertility Insurance 
Although fifteen states
222
 have enacted statutes mandating insur-
ance coverage for infertility treatments, each state’s mandate varies in 
the amount of insurance coverage that employers are required to 
 
 219 § 2612(a)(1)(A). 
 220 See § 2612(a)(1)(D).    
 221 See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(narrowly interpreting the PDA’s “related medical condition” and holding that “the 
District Court properly concluded that infertility is outside of the PDA’s protection 
because it is not pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition”).  
 222 These states include Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
Texas, and West Virginia.  ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-85-137, 23-86-118 (West, Westlaw 
through 2009 Reg. Sess.); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2008); CAL. 
INS. CODE § 10119.6 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-536 (West, Westlaw 
through 2010 Supp.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (Westlaw through the 2009 3d 
Spec. Sess.); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m, 125/5-3 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 
96-885 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-701 (West, Westlaw 
through all ch. of the 2009 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assem.); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
810 (West, Westlaw through all Ch. of the 2009 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assem.); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46 of the 2010 2d Ann. 
Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176A, § 8K (Westlaw through Ch. 46 of the 2010 2d Ann. 
Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176B, § 4J (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46 of the 
2010 2d Ann. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176G, § 4 (Westlaw through Ch. 46 of the 
2010 2d Ann. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-22-1521, 33-31-102 (Westlaw through 
2009 Legis.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:48-6x, 17:48A-7W, 17:48E-35.22 (West 2008); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §17B:27-46.1x (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-4.23 (West 2007); N.Y. 
INS. LAW §§ 3216, 3221, 4303 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1751.01(A)(7) (West, Westlaw through 2009 File 20 of the 128th Gen. Assem.); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-30, 27-19-23, 27-20-20, 27-41-33 (Westlaw through Ch. 365 of the 
Jan. 2009 Sess.); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1366.001–.006 (Vernon, Westlaw through the 
end of the 2009 Reg. and 1st Called Sess. of the 81st Leg.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-
25A-2 (West, Westlaw through H.B. 4040 of 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
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provide and the requirements that women must meet to qualify for 
coverage.
223
  State infertility-insurance laws contain several limitations, 
and while female employees can lobby their state legislature to pass 
legislation mandating any coverage or more comprehensive coverage 
for infertility treatments, such actions may be futile.
224
 
Twelve states have “mandate to cover” laws, which “require in-
surance companies to cover infertility treatment” in every health 
plan.
225
  Two states, California and Texas,
226
 have “mandate to offer” 
laws, which require insurance companies to offer coverage for infer-
tility treatment,
227
 but “[e]mployers are not required . . . to purchase 
this additional coverage.”
228
  Some states require coverage or an offer 
of coverage for IVF only,
229
 and others require coverage for all infertil-
ity treatments except for IVF.
230
 
Additional state-law limitations exist in the form of eligibility re-
quirements for coverage.  Many states limit the number of times that 
a patient may undergo fertility treatment before insurance coverage 
is no longer provided, require a period of years (usually two to five) 
of infertility before a couple is eligible for coverage, require that the 
couple have tried less expensive procedures first, or require that the 
couple be married and that the donor sperm be from the husband.
231
  
Finally, four states also impose age requirements.
232
 
 
 223 See infra notes 225–235 and accompanying text. 
 224 See id. 
 225 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Insurance Coverage for Fertility Laws, 
http://www.ncsl.org/ 
Default.aspx?TabId=14391 (last visited March 22, 2010). 
 226 Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., State Infertility Insurance Laws, 
http://asrm.org/insurance.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2010); Hawkins, supra note 
215, at 214. 
 227 Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 226. 
 228 ARONSON, supra note 1, at 269. 
 229 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-85-137(a) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (Westlaw with amendments through the 2009 Third 
Spec. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 15-810(b) (West, Westlaw through all Ch. of the 
2009 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assem.); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1366.003 (Vernon, Wes-
tlaw through the end of the 2009 Reg. and 1st Called Sess. of the 81st Leg.). 
 230 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(a)-(b) (West 2008); N.Y. INS. LAW § 
3221(k)(6)(C)(v) (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 231 See ARK. INS. DEP’T, RULE AND REGULATION 1, §§ 1(5)(B), (C)(1)–(2) (1991), 
available at 
http://www.insurance.arkansas.gov/Legal%20DataServices/rulesandregs/rnr01.pdf 
(requiring that the couple be married, that the woman’s egg be fertilized by her 
husband’s sperm, and that the couple “have a history of unexplained infertility” for 
at least two years in order to quality for coverage); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-
116.5(a)(3)-(5) (Westlaw with amendments through the 2009 3d Spec. Sess.) (impos-
ing three eligibility requirements for insurance coverage: the couple has been infer-
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In addition to the state statutes’ internal limitations, the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) exempts self-funded 
insurance plans from state law.
233
  Thus, self-insured employers are 
not subject to the minimum infertility-insurance requirements im-
posed by state law.  This is a significant limitation on the protection 
of state law because a majority of covered workers participate in in-
surance plans that are completely or partially self-insured.
234
  Finally, 
state law is limited by the “religious employer” exemption.  Six states 
have an exemption for religious employers whose religious tenets are 
inconsistent with providing insurance coverage for infertility treat-
ments.
235
  Because of the limitations of state law, a federal mandate is 
more appropriate because it establishes a minimum level of uniformi-
ty among the states. 
 
tile for at least five years, the couple has unsuccessfully tried other treatments, and 
the woman’s eggs must be fertilized by her spouse’s sperm); MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 
15-810(c)(2)-(4) (West, Westlaw through all Ch. of the 2009 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. 
Assem.) (requiring that the woman’s egg be fertilized by her spouse’s sperm, that the 
couple have a two-year history of infertility, and that they have exhausted less expen-
sive treatments first); id. § 15-810(d) (allowing entities to limit coverage to three IVF 
attempts per birth not to exceed $100,000 total); see also Hawkins, supra note 215, at 
214–19 (discussing state-law requirements for insurance coverage). 
 232 “Connecticut allows coverage to be excluded when a person turns 40; New Jer-
sey requires coverage for 
patients age 45 or younger; New York’s coverage applies from age 21 to 44; and 
Rhode Island sets age limits of 25 to 40, but only for female patients.”  JESSICA ARONS, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND 
THE LAW 9 (2007) (internal citations omitted), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/pdf/arons_art.pdf. 
 233 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 63–65 
(1990) (holding that ERISA, not state law, regulates self-insured plans). 
 234 Hawkins, supra note 215, at 220 n.125 (citing Kaiser Family Found., Employer 
Health Benefits 2005 Annual Survey, http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/sections 
/ehbs05-sec10-1.cfm (last visited May 22, 2010) (noting that “54% of covered workers 
in 2005 [were] in a plan that [was] completely or partially self-funded”)).  
 235 These states include California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, 
and Texas.    
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(f) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38a-
509(c)–(e), 38a-536(c)–(e) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Supp.); 215 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/356m(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-882 of the 2010 Reg. 
Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810(e) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 17:48-6x(b), 17:48A-7w(b), 17:48E-35.22(b) (West 2008); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 17B:27-46.1x(b) (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §26:2J-4.23(b) (West 2007); 
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1366.006 (Vernon, Westlaw through the end of the 2009 Reg. 
and 1st Called Sess. of the 81st Legislature); see ARONS, supra note 232, at 42 n.45.  
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D. The Family Building Act Is the Best Option for Mandating 
Infertility Insurance 
The most compelling option for women who need insurance 
coverage for infertility treatment is to lobby their representatives in 
Congress to pass the Family Building Act of 2009 (“the Act”), pro-
posed by Representative Anthony Weiner in the 111th Congress.
236
  
The Act is not subject to as many restrictions as state infertility-
insurance laws.  First, the Act requires insurance carriers to cover the 
costs of infertility treatments including all ARTs.
237
  Second, the Act is 
not preempted by ERISA.
238
  Instead, the Act amends the Public 
Health Service Act and ERISA to require insurance coverage for the 
treatment of infertility.
239
  Third, the Act applies to all employers—
 
 236 Family Building Act of 2009, H.R. 697, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=
f:h697ih.txt.pdf.  On January 26, 2009, the Act was introduced and referred to the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, the House Committee on Education 
and Labor, and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.  See 
Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status for the 110th Congress (2007–2008), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/D?d111:1:./temp/~bdjKRz::|/ 
bss/111search.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2009). The bill has been introduced by Rep-
resentative Anthony Weiner in every session of Congress since 1999.  See Family 
Building Act of 2007, H.R. 2892, 110th Cong. (2007), available at, 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=
f:h2892ih.txt.pdf; Family Building Act of 2005, H.R. 735, 109th Cong. (2005), availa-
ble at, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_ 
bills&docid=f:h735ih.txt.pdf; Family Building Act of 2003, H.R. 3014, 108th Cong. 
(2003) available at, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 
108_cong_bills&docid=f:h3014ih.txt.pdf; Family Building Act of 2001, H.R. 389, 
107th Cong. (2001), available at, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_bills&docid=f:h389ih.txt.pdf; Family Building Act 
of 1999, H.R. 2706, 106th Cong. (1999), available at, http://frwebgate. 
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_bills&docid=f:h2706ih.txt.pdf. 
 237 H.R. 697 § 2708(a)(1), 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://frwebgate. 
access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h697ih.txt.pdf. 
 238 See Hawkins, supra note 215, at 219 n.122.  ERISA preempts any state law “relat-
ing to any employee benefit plan” and thus significantly limits the effectiveness of 
state mandates for insurance coverage.  Id. 
 239 The Family Building Act of 2009 states the following findings: 
(1) Infertility is a disease affecting more than 6,000,000 American 
women and men, about 10 percent of the reproductive age population. 
(2) Recent improvements in therapy make pregnancy possible for 
more couples than in past years. 
(3) The majority of group health plans do not provide coverage for in-
fertility therapy. 
(4) A fundamental part of the human experience is fulfilling the desire 
to reproduce. 
H.R. 697 § 1.  
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and contains no exemption for religious employers
240
—as well as all 
people, regardless of age.
241
  Finally, the Act also provides the floor, 
not the ceiling, of insurance coverage; that is, it does not preempt 
state law that provides greater benefits to infertile couples.
242
 
The Act does, however, retain some common state-law limita-
tions—albeit less stringent ones—on insurance coverage to achieve 
cost-effectiveness.  First, the Act provides insurance coverage for 
ARTs only where “the participant or beneficiary has been unable to 
bring a pregnancy to a live birth through less costly medically appro-
priate infertility treatments for which coverage is available under the 
insured’s policy, plan, or contract.”
243
  Furthermore, the Act limits the 
fertility procedures covered to those that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services deems “non-experimental.”
244
  Finally, the Act im-
poses a lifetime cap of six on the number of egg retrievals that can be 
covered by insurance.
245
  After four egg retrievals are performed, in-
surance is no longer required to cover additional retrievals unless a 
live birth results from one of the egg retrievals; in that case, two more 
egg retrievals are covered, for a maximum of six egg retrievals.
246
 
The Act provides the most promising way for infertile couples to 
receive insurance coverage that will enable them to undergo infertili-
ty procedures because it recognizes the significance of the dream of 
having children and appropriately addresses the financial obstacles 
 
 240 The absence of an exemption in the statute would likely overcome a constitu-
tional challenge based on the First Amendment’s Free Exercise of Religion Clause.  
The constitutional issue is nearly identical in contraception-insurance cases.  Two 
states have upheld state laws that mandate insurance coverage for contraception 
without providing an exemption for religious employers.  See Catholic Charities of 
the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 528 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that state’s 
contraceptive-equity act mandating that health-insurance plans that provide prescrip-
tion-drug coverage also cover prescription contraceptives did not violate the state 
constitution’s free-exercise clause); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Supe-
rior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 91–94 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the state’s contraceptive-
equity act mandating that certain employer health and disability plans that cover pre-
scription drugs also cover prescription contraceptives did not violate state constitu-
tion’s free-exercise clause even when reviewed under strict scrutiny). 
 241 See generally H.R. 697. 
 242 Id. § 2708(h). 
 243 § 2708(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 244 § 2708(b)(1).  The Secretary makes this determination “after consultation with 
appropriate professional and patient organizations such as the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine, RESOLVE, and the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists.”  Id. 
 245 § 2708(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 246 Id. 
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that put that dream at risk.  At the same time, the Act is economical 
and includes provisions to minimize the cost to employers. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Women undergoing IVF constitute a class vulnerable to adverse 
employment actions, whether it is because employers view them as 
potentially becoming pregnant or whether employers simply do not 
want to pay for the cost of the infertility treatment.  Infertility affects 
women in a unique way in that their childbearing capacity requires 
them to undergo time-intensive surgical impregnation procedures.  
Confronted with this reality, the Hall court provided women with 
broader protection under the PDA by recognizing that it is a woman’s 
childbearing capacity, not her infertility, which distinguishes her ex-
perience with infertility from that of a man.  This biological differ-
ence, the capacity to become pregnant, exposes women to employer 
actions that endanger their workplace status. 
Because employers are not required to provide full or even par-
tial coverage for infertility treatments in every state, national guide-
lines are necessary to adequately protect women trying to conceive via 
IVF.  In order to provide this nationwide, comprehensive protection 
for women, Congress should clarify that the scope of the PDA en-
compasses employer actions that discriminate on the basis of a wom-
an’s childbearing capacity or other sex-specific conditions related to 
pregnancy.  This clarifying legislation would prohibit employers from 
terminating female employees based on their need to undergo IVF 
because such action would constitute pregnancy discrimination. 
While a broader definition of the protected class would come 
closer to providing women with equal opportunities in the workplace, 
the PDA is still inadequate to compel employers to provide insurance 
coverage for infertility treatments.  Given the importance of having a 
family, and the rise in technology that has allowed couples to achieve 
pregnancy, denying infertile couples a chance at parenthood would 
be unfair.  Therefore, a uniform policy of insurance coverage, such as 
the Family Building Act of 2009, is needed to provide millions of in-
fertile couples with the ability to create a family. 
 
